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I.
Usually the question of the beginning poses the most hitches for the inquiry of
the past. The flagship example is an age-old question about the origin of the world
or the efficient cause of the world creation, which has drawn the attention of
thinkers from antiquity onwards. 
Reference to the beginning and driving force of the world allowed one to es-
tablish a sense of order in antiquity, which the Greeks called κόσµος (kósmos),
maintained by subsequent hypotheses, and characterized often by a mélange of
truth and invention. That is why the ancient Greeks were able to extract the forms
of discourse on the past (ἱστορία; istoría), clearly demarcating ἀλήθεια (alátheia)
from δόξα (dóxa). The combination of truth and fiction Greeks called µῦθος
(mythos) that fulfilled educational functions by future generations and thus rein-
forced collective memory. 
In the second half of the twentieth century, Roland Barthes devoted attention
in his Mythologies to the distinction between δόξα and µῦθος, whereby the former
meets system function, while the latter sign was understood to be a tool of
ideology.1 The “myth,” as a form of discourse about the past, draws its roots there-
fore in antiquity, not only Greek but also Hindu or Chinese. Mythology, as the
This is a version of the statement “Heroes and enemies: Weltanschauung and the Emergence of Cen-
tral and Eastern National Identities after the First World War,” presented at the International con-
ference “National Identities in Central Europe in the Light of Changing European Geopolitics
1918–1948,” held on June, 29, 21015 in Brno, Czech Republic.
Cf. R. Barthes (1957), Mythologies, Paris: Seuil.
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Cf. A. N. Whitehead (1933), Adventures of Ideas, New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 209 ff.
Cf. J. W. von Goethe (1811), Aus meinem Leben: Dichtung und Wahrheit, Tübingen: Cotta.
Cf. A. Rosenberg (1930), Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts. Eine Wertung der seelisch-geistigen
Gestaltenkämpfe unserer Zeit, München: Hoheneichen-Verl.
Cf. E. Cassirer (1946), The Myth of the State, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Cf. G. Orwell (1949), Nineteen Eighty-Four, London: Secker & Warburg.
Cf. G. Orwell (1949), Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 24: “The Party said that Oceania had never been in
alliance with Eurasia. He, Winston Smith, knew that Oceania had been in alliance with Eurasia as
short a time as four years ago. But where did that knowledge exist? Only in his own consciousness,
which in any case must soon be annihilated. And if all others accepted the lie which the Party imposed
-if all records told the same tale -- then the lie passed into history and became truth. ‘Who controls
the past,’ ran the Party slogan, ‘controls the future: who controls the present controls the past.’ And
yet the past, though of its nature alterable, never had been altered. Whatever was true now was true
from everlasting to everlasting. It was quite simple. All that was needed was an unending series of
victories over your own memory. ‘Reality control’, they called it: in Newspeak, ‘doublethink’.”
Cf. H. Tudor (1972), The Political Myth, London: Pall Mall; Ch. Flood (1996), Political Myth, New
York: Garland Pub; Ch. Bottici (2007), A Philosophy of  Political Myth, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
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science of myths, was a relatively late product, as it was coined in the seventeenth
century, and the notion of ideology, as the logic of ideas, in the eighteenth century.
The Early Modern Times with the “Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns”
will bring therefore not only the hullabaloo of new ideas with old, not just the fas-
cination for the Enlightenment, the interest for the beginnings of history, scientif-
ically studied, but also the attention for phenomena less rationally explicable,
deeply immersed in myths and stories out of this world. Although the fascination
with the notions of utopia, myth and ideology will appear in the nineteenth century,
it is only the twentieth century that the consequences of these interests would float
on the border between the appearance and the reality, what—according to White-
head—seduced the West since the days of Plato.2 The blurring line between
Goethe’s Dichtung und Wahrheit (Poetry and Truth)3 in the discourse of the public
sphere became a reality in the thirties, thanks to The Myth of the Twentieth Century
by Alfred Rosenberg.4 But not every myth, created in the twentieth century led to
so gigantic disaster. Since the beginning of the twentieth century myths had be-
come a part of the political discourses that merged thinking on the ideas of the
nation or country, with those regarding the world, fatherland or homeland. Never-
theless, in the middle of the century, in 1946 was published Ernst Cassirer’s
posthumous book The Myth of the State5 and, three years later, in Nineteen Eighty-
Four6 George Orwell diagnosed the uses of the past in politics that the Greeks ap-
pointed πολιτικός (politikós), and essentially signified the theory and practice of
influencing other people.7 Since the 1970s the topic of political myths has gained
in importance within Anglo-Saxon political theory.8 At the start of the second mil-
lennium the so-called “Clash of Civilizations” marked the return of myths not
only on the national level, but also on the level of entire civilizations.
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II.
It would not be an oversimplification to state that the eighteenth century gave
birth to the essential elements of modern politics: importantly, new visions of law
and statehood, as well as attempts at their violent implementation. New and old
socio-political accounts—competing with each other—generated new patterns
and gave birth to new notions such as the “nation-state” and “citizenship.” These
developments occurred in a wider current of growing interest in the past, under-
stood not only in terms of continuity (e.g. of empires, kingdoms, principalities or
republics), but also as a newly construed, continuous entity, namely, the notion
of fatherland or homeland, with its proper nation and language. Therefore, in the
nineteenth century, the ideas of fatherland and nation increasingly influenced dis-
course in the public sphere, as affected not only by those in power, but also by the
“body politic”, the broader, everyday concerns of citizens. These developments
were not only built upon the foundation of preexisting territories, which could be
defended (like Russia during the Napoleonic wars), for which nations could vie
(like Poles at all possible fronts), or that could be won (as overseas colonies or East-
ern European lands), but also upon new strategies of national development. 
The classic example of such development is Germany, whose appearance on
the map as a single entity was marked by the development of a national conscious-
ness on the basis of idealist philosophy and the development of science within a
reworked education system (Bildung). The fruits of these efforts were especially
pertinent at the beginning of the twentieth century when we see the development
of the notion of ideology, as the logic of ideas, and Weltanschauung (worldview), as
the view of the world. The nineteenth century was thus not only a period of great
thinkers, systems, utopias and ideologies, but also of the rapid growth of the con-
cept of Weltanschauung, according to which the world was ordered and its partic-
ular components evaluated according to the ethical, moral, aesthetic and economic
spheres. Thus, in the beginning of the twentieth century, Europe was a scene not
only of military and technological hostilities, but also of philosophical and ideo-
logical confrontations. World War I brought with it a new meaning of “heroic,”
stimulated by the power of ideas, words, and technology, among them, military
and pharmacological inventions (e.g. diacetylmorphine marked since 1895 by the
German drug company Bayer under the trademark name “Heroin”). Clarity was
won, as influenced by the concept of Weltanschauung, thanks to the dichotomous
ordering of the world into truth and falsehood, black and white, good and evil, heroes
and enemies. 
In the ambiance of ideological and military confrontations, “heroism” advanced
gradually—above all in the first decades of the twentieth century and especially
since 1905—to a secular form of “holiness,” the quintessence of virtue, an ideal
worthy of the “ultimate sacrifice.” Equally simplified, the “enemy” became that,
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which was to be destroyed, and doing so, the task of the “hero.” The end of the
First World War brought far-reaching changes in the geopolitics of Europe: on the
map appeared a new country, Czechoslovakia, as well as a re-emerged Poland. Al-
though First World War ended with an armistice, the ideological confrontations
were compounded in all areas of the public sphere. This was possible thanks to
the various reformulations of the notion of Weltanschauung in all parts of Europe,
which intertwined with the creation of new coalitions of ideas and ideological in-
terests. The notions of “hero” and “enemy” would also gain new, and freshly am-
plified, significance. 
But what does this strange word mean—Weltanschauung—this word that we
can find in both French and English dictionaries?9 It is the representation of the
world, to which whole systems of values is subordinated.10 This idea of the world
could be a bone of contention between particular states, groups of people or single
persons. In the beginning of the twentieth century Heinrich Gomperz in Austria11
and Wilhelm Dilthey in Germany proposed distinct theories of this concept.12
After the First World War the notion appear in Georg Simmel’s posthumously
published work on Lebensanschauung and in Karl Jaspers’ Psychologie der Weltan-
schauungen.13 In the interbellum period, the concept itself would be—on one
hand—a key word of German philosophy within all possible streams of thought
and—on the other hand—a frequently used passe-partout of the Third Reich, as
Victor Klemperer observed in his diary Lingua Tertii Imperii.14 It is difficult to an-
ticipate how this concept will develop further. This is because it has nourished dif-
ferent approaches: from patriotic or nationalistic (in the British sense of the term)
to the totalitarian (national socialist of the Third Reich or communist of the Soviet
Union). The potential danger of this concept can be seen in the official song of
the Hitler-Jugend: “Today we have Germany, and tomorrow the whole world”
(“Und heute gehört uns Deutschland und morgen die ganze Welt.”).15 There are
numerous examples of how Weltanschauung has become myth itself within pow-
erful twentieth century political rhetoric.
III. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the geographical center of the continent,
from the Balkans to the Vistula Spit, a region that had been consecutively disre-
garded in the past as the western or eastern “periphery,” caused gigantic convulsions
of world nations by unleashing profound geopolitical reformulations. On the po-
litical arena new states appeared, new persons with new visions for the region
gained power, new (hi)stories were told, and new myths were formulated.
One of the relevant examples of the mythical creation of the twentieth century
is the person of Józef Piłsudski, whose portrait was sketched by Bruno Schulz in
the thirties, shortly after the death of the “commander in chief” or “guide,” as he
was usually called:
He emerged from the underground of history, from graves, from the past. He
was leaden by dreams of bards, misty by delusions of poets, charged by mar-
tyrdom of generations. He was the sequel in its entirety. He dragged history
behind him, as a coat for all of Poland.
His face was perhaps in his lifetime, the face of an individual human. Probably
those, who were close to him, knew his smile and the clouds passing before
him, the light moments on his face. Individual features become lost in the in-
creasing distance between us, becoming increasingly cloudy, while increasingly
radiating outward, internal features that are greater, broader, and that contain
hundreds of faces from the past. In dying, entering eternity, that face dreams
memories, wandering through a series of faces that are increasingly pale, more
spacious and even more radiating until in the end, from the layers of these faces
laid upon her, cools into its shape, the mask that is the final image of Poland
– forever.16
Cf. B Schulz: “Powstają legendy” [Legends are Created], in: Powstają legendy. Trzy szkice wokół Pił-
sudskiego [Legends are Created. Three Outlines about Piłsudski], introduced  and edited by S. Rosiek,
Kraków: Oficyna Literacka 1993, p. 25: ”Tenże [Piłsudski] wyszedł z podziemi historii, z grobów, z
przeszłości. Był ciężki marzeniami wieszczów, mglisty rojeniami poetów, obciążony męczeństwem
pokoleń. Był cały dalszym ciągiem. Ciągnął za sobą przeszłość, jak płaszcz ogromny na całą Polskę.
Jego twarz była może za życia twarzą indywidualnego człowieka. Zapewne ci, którzy byli w pobliżu
niego, znali Jego uśmiech i zachmurzenie, błyski chwili na jego twarzy. Nam z daleka coraz bardziej
gubią się indywidualne rysy, stają się mgliste i przepuszczają od wewnątrz jakieś promieniowanie
rysów większych, obszerniejszych, mieszczących w sobie setki minionych twarzy.
Umierając, wchodząc w wieczność, marzy ta twarz wspomnieniami, wędruje przez szereg twarzy,
coraz bledsza, przestronniejsza i promienniejsza, aż w końcu z nawarstwień tych twarzy układa się
na niej i zastyga w maskę ostateczną oblicze Polski – już na zawsze.”
16
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Already in the past Poland drew strength from myths, which allowed the Poles to
survive partitions and the brutal assimilation policies enacted in the enslaved ter-
ritories by Russia, Prussia and Austria-Hungary. Poland was herself understood in
mythical terms: as the Christ of Nations – a people made to suffer for the sins of
others, but a people who ultimately rise victorious from that suffering, and even
arise victorious because of it. Therefore, the myth of the Slavic Pope, created by
Juliusz Słowacki in 1848, is another example of national consciousness expressed
within literary creations, and based on a blend of patriotism and religion:
He will distribute love like a warlord
Pass out arms;
His strength sacramental will gather the cosmos
Into his palms.
Then will he send glad tidings to flutter
Like Noah’s dove;
News that the spirit’s here and acknowledged,
Shining alone.
And we shall see part nicely before him
The sky above.
He’ll stand on his throne, illumined, creating
Both world and throne. […]
His voice will transform the nations to brethren.
Burnt offerings
Circle the spirits in their march toward
Their final goal.
Strength sacramental of hundreds of nations
Will help our king
See that the spirits’ work overpowers
Death’s mournful toll.
The wounds of the world shall he cleanse, and banish
Rot, pus and all
He will redeem the world and bring to it
Both health and love.
He shall sweep clean the insides of churches
And clear the hall,
And then reveal the Lord our Creator
Shining above.17
17 Quoted from: M. H. Kowalewicz, The Role of John Paul II in the Twentieth-Century Exodus
from Enslavement to Freedom, in: De Revolutionibus Orbium Populorum Ioannis Pauli II. The Pope
Against Social Exclusion, ed. by K. Pilarczyk in coop. with G. Sokołowski, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo
Sejmowe 2015, pp. 68f [English version]. Cf. also the original cited in the Polish version of the men-
tioned text, p. 68f.:
On rozda miłość, jak dziś mocarze
Rozdają broń,
Therefore, the myth of Poland as the Christ of Nations, the French myth of the
Grand Nation and the German myth of the Übermensch, are closely connected to
the specific national Weltanschauung and to the role played by the particular nation
within the history of the world, as understood through the lens of the given
Weltanschauung.
IV.
Polish collective memory and national mythology is also linked in many ways with
historical events connected to the struggle for Polish independence and national
existence: the struggle for Freedom and Liberty under the command of Kosciuszko
and Lafayette in America and Poland, armed participation in the Napoleonic wars
in the ranks of the Grand Army, the November Uprising in 1830/31, the 1863/64
Rebellion or the struggle against the colonial politics of the Russian Empire, the
Kingdom of Prussia and Austria-Hungary, not with weapons, but through me-
thodical and meaningful contributions made to the world’s scientific, technolog-
ical, economic and cultural heritage and finally also systematic resistance against
Russification by the Russian Empire and Germanization by Bismarck’s Germany. 
The new myths were also born in Poland with the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, not only around the armed struggle against invaders, not just around defend-
ers of the territories and national heroes, not only surrounding statehood and the
Commonwealth, but above all for “the commons” of civil society.18 Poland was
Sakramentalną moc on pokaże,
Świat wziąwszy w dłoń;
Gołąb mu słowa w hymnie wyleci,
Poniesie wieść,
Nowinę słodką, że duch już świeci
I ma swą cześć;
Niebo się nad nim piękne otworzy
Z obojga stron,
Bo on na świecie stanął i tworzy 
I świat, i tron […]
Takiego ducha wkrótce ujrzycie
Cień, potem twarz:
Wszelką z ran świata wyrzuci zgniłość,
Robactwo, gad,
Zdrowie przyniesie, rozpali miłość
I zbawi świat;
Wnętrze kościołów on powymiata,
Oczyści sień,
Boga pokaże w twórczości świata,
Jasno jak dzień.
“The commons” understood by Poles at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are close 18
Heroes and Enemies 69
Michel Henri Kowalewicz70
to the modern interpretation, referring to ethics and axiology, not only to material goods. Cf. e.g.
the modern definition of „commons”, presented in the statement of David Bollier in American Acad-
emy in Berlin December, 4th 2012: „The commons is at heart an ethic -- a way of being human
that goes beyond homo economicus, the selfish, rational, utility-maximizing ideal of a human being
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plements formal government:” http://p2pfoundation.net/Commons_as_a_New_Paradigm_for_Gov-
ernance,_Economics _  and _Policy [05.11.15].
Cf. M. H. Kowalewicz (2015), Symbolika roku jubileuszowego Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. „Kozi
róg” albo „dzień ubłagania po wszystkiej ziemi waszej” [Symbolism of the Jagiellonian University’s
jubilee. “The goat’s horn” or “the day of atonement throughout all your land”], in-print.
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arguably the most convincing example of underground civil society in the twen-
tieth century: from the dawn of the century to the eighties and the movement of
Solidarity. 
Poland entered the twentieth century with two important myths of civil dis-
obedience that have been inscribed forever in the Polish collective memory: the
myth of children struggling with Bismarck’s policy of Kulturkampf in Września
(the region of Greater Poland) by strike that refused instruction of religion and
music in German language, protests that occurred in the years 1901–1904 and
inspired following movements of students in 1907, and the myth of Russian Em-
pire’s opponents, systematically deported from the ancient territories of Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth for penal labor in Siberia (e.g. after the Uprising of
1863/64 and the unrest of 1905/07). Kept alive within Poland’s collective memory,
was the myth of those deported Poles, hardened by Siberia’s arctic cold and the
brutality of the Russian authorities (a collective experience that would be repeated
under the Soviet authorities). A special place in Polish remembrance is also reserved
for the oldest Polish university, the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. In 1864 the
university was not able to celebrate its jubilee because of the Austrian repressions
following the Uprising of 1863/64. Festivities were renewed in 1900, a year full
of hope for new century and expressions of national unity in all former territories
of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.19
The consecutive examples of Polish civil courage in the face of foreign aggres-
sors, resulted in increased repressions, but also gave rise to more and more myths.
Polish recalcitrance in relation to the aggressors has often been compared by ob-
servers in Western Europe with the fight of the Irish against the English. In both
Poland and Ireland the incessant struggle for commons and national independence
was closely linked to the religious system of values. Examples of the irritated votes
from foreign observers were initially published in The Times in 1866, were recalled
by Norman Davies—one hundred forty years later—in his brilliant work Europe:
East & West: 
‘The Poles are the Irish of the Continent,’ they said, talking of ‘their unstable
character, their incapacity for self-government, and the futility of their schemes’
– ‘a very hot-headed and unreasonable people, who have quarreled with their
benefactors, the Russians, without any cause’. In support of their ‘Imperial rea-
soning’, as they put it, they accepted that ‘Russia is made to govern’, That Rus-
sia is ‘a Power which has been, and always will be, successful,’ that ‘the Poles
have nothing left but to submit’. ‘Poland,’ they concluded, ‘is now nothing,
and can do nothing.’ At the same time, these self-important Victorians were
thoroughly outraged by the idea that British rule in England was comparable
in any way to tsarist rule in Poland. ‘How many . . . tens of thousands {of Poles}
have been dragged from their homes since 1830 and marched to the depths of
Siberia or shut up in dungeons at home! Where is the parallel to this in Ire-
land?20
Almost all Polish history since the eighteenth century was arranged in accordance
with one myth or another, be it the histories written either by the Poles themselves,
the invaders or external observers of the successive aggressions upon the territories
of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Poland’s second Republic, a state
since 1918, would survive only two decades before being attacked, in September
1939, from two sides simultaneously: on September 1st in the West by Nazi Ger-
many and on September 17th in the East by Soviet Russia. As decided in Yalta in
1945, the price for the Third Reich’s defeat and the liberation of Western Europe
was the further enslavement of Poland, which lasted until 1989. 
The myths surrounding the independent Poland of the interwar period, includ-
ing the new Polish economy and Polish science, and the most symbolic of Polish
triumphs in the Polish-Soviet War in 1920, the so-called “Miracle on the Vistula
River,” became points of obsession for both the Third Reich and the Soviet Union.
Therefore the consecutive myths: of the September 1939 campaign, Katyń,
Squadron 303 in the Battle for Britain, the Battle of Narvik, the struggles for To-
brouk and Monte Cassino, the Warsaw Uprising or the Insurrection in Warsaw’s
Ghetto, the government in exile (first in Paris, than in Angers and finally in Lon-
don), Mikołajczyk’s referendum and—last but not least—the Polish Church’s clan-
destine role in the race for independence – provide national exemplars of bravery,
but also persons that become myths in the collective memory of Poles. Of course,
one of them is certainly Józef Piłsudski, but it is not however a singular myth,
which was cultivated by patriots and aggressors. The myth of Pilsudski was (and
is) not even a myth of a particular person, but a myth of a historical figure incar-
nating the Resurrection of Poland. This myth is a complement and fulfillment of
the myth of Poland, as the Christ of Nations. This difference is evident thanks to
Schulz, who contrasted Pilsudski with Napoleon:
Cf. N. Davis (2006), Europe : East & West, London: Jonathan Cape, p. 23.20
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Cf. Cf. B Schulz: “Powstają legendy” [Legends are Created], p. 25: “Napoleon reprezentował
tylko siebie. Ubrał się w historię jak w płaszcz królewski, zrobił z niej tren wspaniały dla swojej
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E. M. Remarque (1928), Im Westen nichts Neues, Berlin: Propyläen-Verl.
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Napoleon represented only himself. He dressed himself in history as the royal
coat, made as a train great for his career. One of the moments of his strength
was that he was not charged by tradition, not burdened with the past. He [Pił-
sudski] emerged from the underground of history, from graves, from the past.
He was leaden by dreams of bards, misty by delusions of poets, charged by
martyrdom of generations. He was the sequel in its entirety. He dragged history
behind him, as a coat for all of Poland.21
Therefore, to reduce the history of interwar Poland to the history of one person
might be an obvious oversimplification.  The search for a single, most vivid myth
in Polish history during the years 1918-1948 seems to be devoid of deeper mean-
ing, because in doing so we would be forced to compare and contrast not only the
persons under consideration, but we would have to do so across incomparable pe-
riods and geopolitical, social and military contexts.
V.
Therefore the simple question of who or what became myth in the period 1918-
1948 in Central and Eastern Europe looks to be at the same time both easy and
difficult to answer. This question appears simple and yet singular, satisfying answers
are difficult to find, especially when dealing with this vast region, but also even in
regards to particular states. This question is largely connected with the founding
myths and the rising of national identities of the states that gained independence
following the First World War. Each new state brought with it its own the baggage
of past experiences. Additionally, the politics of the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury was changing so dynamically, bringing with it all fuzzy responses to a world
politics replete with new heroes and new enemies of history. History was written
like never before from the perspective of national capital cities (including Warsaw,
Berlin, and Moscow, but also Paris and London), from the point of view of the
interests of altering diplomatic agreements, military ententes or changing core val-
ues and defense goals. Although Erich Maria Remarque’s 1929 novel, All Quiet
on the Western Front (Im Westen nichts Neues) was believed to have given the world
an antiwar manifesto,22 but already four years later this bestseller will be burned
by the Nazi regime in Germany. At the same time, the old myths surrounding the
Franco-Prussian War would be reborn with an equally intensity on both sides of
the Rhine, and new myth would be born regarding the colonization of territories
in Central and Eastern Europe. 
This challenge can also be seen in the case of France. Who was the person whom
we might unequivocally identify as a national myth in this very short but also how
long period between 1918 and 1948? Is it Jean Jaurès, an antimilitarist and pacifist
who was assassinated in July 1914,23 or Marshal Philippe Pétain, generally known
as “the Lion of Verdun,” or Marshal Pétain, the Head of State of Vichy France in
the forties? As we can see, history is in no way static. Also in Poland the dynamics
of the first half of the twentieth century brings new highs and lows, new heroes
and new myths. The question is therefore fully justified: is Piłsudski, an uncon-
tested hero in November 1918 and during the War with Soviet Union in 1920,
the same hero in the collective memory of Poles before and after September 1939.
Furthermore, is he the same mythical figure in the year 1948 or in the 1980s dur-
ing the Solidarity movement? 
One important remark: between 1918 and 1948 we have not only to do with
the period flanked by wars, but also with a completely new order after the Second
World War. The German occupation in the time between 1939 and 1945 was not
a simple episode in the history of Europe but the turning point in the whole world
history. If the period after Second World War is a new one, are Poland’s wartime
heroes, such as General Władysław Sikorski and General Władysław Anders, much
like General Charles De Gaulle or General Philippe Leclerc de Hautecloque in
France, Poland’s new national heroes? Can they be counted among the national
myths in the collective memory, especially in the public sphere? Is Marshall Pil-
sudski in 1948 really more of a national myth then Anders or Sikorski? The ques-
tion is an open one, but for the Polish collective memory the national myth is not
so much one linked with single figures, but rather with the wider symbolic notion
of the warrior (soldier or civil) fighting against the Russians, Germans, Austrians
and other national enemies over the ages. This picture is nicely painted in 1938
by Bruno Schulz after Pilsudski’s death: “In dying, entering eternity, that face
dreams memories, wandering through a series of faces that are increasingly pale,
more spacious and even more radiating until in the end, from the layers of these
faces laid upon her, cools into its shape, the mask that is the final image of Poland
– forever.” Hence, the symbolic hero may be moreover a figure of a Polish warrior,
fighting in official uniforms, but also in civilian life. It is not the unknown or un-
named soldier alone that fits this myth, but the notion of the combatant more
widely understood; those who have struggled for Poland and thus marked Polish
history in any number of ways. This struggle has been recorded not only by Poles
themselves, but also by the invaders and also historiographers from outside, thus
Cf. J. Jaurès (1903, 2014), Maudite soit la guerre: discours à la jeunesse et autres paroles publiques, [pré-
face de Pierre-Yves Ruff ], Saint-Martin-de-Bonfossé: Théolib.
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About the philosophical position between realism and Neo-Kantianism of Masaryk before the First
World War cf. F. Krejčí, Filosofie posledních let před válkou, Praha: Jan Laichter 1918, pp. 267ff; about
the research of specific Czechoslovak national character in the thirties: E. Chalupný, Národní filosofie
československá, vol. 1: Národní povaha československá, Praha: Bursik a Kohout 1932.
The realism and pragmatism in politics represented at the time his political rival, Roman Dmowski,
another myth of Polish collective memory.
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the myth of the warrior has been etched into the national consciousness from var-
ious points of view.
Were we to search for a definitive definition of the enemy, we would have and
equally difficult time. The statement that my ally is the enemy of my enemy is
not very useful in the case of Poland. It is really not so difficult to find heroes in
Poland, and in the collective memory Józef Piłsudski is one, and occupies an im-
portant place for many Poles. But if we are talking about enemies here we have
also more then one. To understand this complex condition we must return to the
eighteenth century. This was a glorious century for Western Europe but not so for
Poland, as it was the time of the national Partitions. Glorious, however, was the
regular and organized fight for Freedom and Liberty, and it would be those Poles
fighting for national freedom who would enter the pantheon of national myth.
For example, the Polish soldier of the Grand Army survived in a myth born in
France combining both the high alcohol tolerance of Poles and their heroic efficacy
in the battlefield.
VI.
In 1918, when Polish independence was proclaimed, the model of the German
state were not so far away from Piłsudski’s political vision of government within
his Weltanschauung and view of culture. Curiously, the approach to German phi-
losophy distinguished arguably the future president of Czechoslovakia, Tomáš Gar-
rigue Masaryk, a philosopher who seems to have been more attracted by rationalist
and humanist philosophy,24 from the future leader of Poland, Józef Piłsudski, by
the romantic, Promethean philosophy, closer to the German idealism.25 The ref-
erence to the German model changes with time and in September 1939 we have,
like we can see in the Polish war propaganda, the Polish Army fighting for western
civilization within German barbarian culture. The ambiguous synonymy of both
terms can be seen in their interchangeable use within the discourse of the press at
the time of intensified political tensions between the Allies and Germany, partic-
ularly when faced with the invasion of Poland on September 3, 1939. The Illus-
trated Daily Courier, in an article entitled “Poland again in the vanguard of
Europe,” introduces both the concept of culture and civilization, stressing that 
Poland is present today not only in self-defense. It [Poland] occurs in defense
of threatened international peace and order. It [Poland] occurs as a bulwark of
Western culture, Christian culture, based on the principles of freedom, justice
and equity. [...] Two civilizations are today facing each other in mortal combat:
Christian civilization and pagan civilization, the Roman civilization and the
Germanic civilization, governments of rule of law and morality with the gov-
ernments of lawlessness and crime in international life.26
The next day, on September 4, 1939, The Warsaw National Journal, in the article
“Hey allies,” reassures the inhabitants of Warsaw as follows: 
All the powerful forces of three allied big powers of the peace front will be used
to destroy the nest of crime and violence, so that in the world will reign a better
and more lasting peace, so that future generations of free nations can maintain
their political freedom, and so that civilization will prevail over lawlessness and
the madness of people who to accommodate the interests of one nation want
to surrender to its reign the whole of Europe, and later the whole world.27
At the end of the second week of struggles with the forces of the Third Reich The
Evening of Warsaw, from September 12, 1939, presented readers with the article
“Eden exposes the intentions of Germany. The fracture plan of the resistance in
the East and the plan of concluding peace at the expense of Poland,” which was a
declaration of Robert Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in
Chamberlain’s government: 
The government of Nazi is under the illusion that winning the attack on Poland
would lead to a quick peace. This is not true. Repeating the words of Cham-
berlain, Eden emphasizes that England is not fighting for a distant city and a
distant country, but in order to liberate the modern world from the bondage
of Nazism. All the dominions of Great Britain, even Canada and Australia,
New Zealand and India as well as overseas colonies declare part in the war. Old
Cf. article “Polska znów przednią strażą Europy”, in: Ilustrowany Kuryer codzienny, September, 3rd
1939, p. 3: “Polska występuje dziś jednak nie tylko w obronie własnej. Występuje ona w obronie za-
grożonego ładu i porządku międzynarodowego. Występuje jako przedmurze kultury zachodniej, kul-
tury chrześcijańskiej, opartej na zasadach wolności, sprawiedliwości i słuszności. [...] Dwie cywilizacje
stają dziś naprzeciwko siebie w śmiertelnej walce. Cywilizacja chrześcijańska z cywilizacją pogańską,
cywilizacja rzymska z cywilizacją germańską, rządy prawa i moralności z rządami bezprawia i prze-
stępczości w życiu międzynarodowym.”
Cf. article „Czołem sojusznikom”, in: “Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy”, Spetember, 4th 1939, p. 3:
“Wszystkie potężne siły trzech sprzymierzonych mocarstw frontu pokoju zostaną zużyte w celu znisz-
czenia gniazda zbrodni i gwałtu, ażeby w świecie zapanował lepszy i trwalszy pokój, ażeby przyszłe
pokolenia wolnych narodów mogły zachować swą wolność polityczną, ażeby cywilizacja zapanowała
nad bezprawiem i szaleństwem ludzi, którzy dla dogodzenia interesom jednego narodu chcą podpo-
rządkować swemu panowaniu całą Europę, a potym [sic] cały świat.”  
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Cf. article in “Wieczór Warszawski”, September, 12 th 1939, p. 2: “Rząd hitlerowski łudzi się, że zwy-
cięski atak na Polskę doprowadzi do szybkiego pokoju. Nieprawda. Powtarzając słowa Chamberlaina,
Eden podkreśla, że Anglia nie walczy dla jakiegoś dalekiego miasta i dalekiego kraju, ale poto [sic!]
by wyswobodzić świat współczesny z więzów hitleryzmu. Wszystkie dominia Wielkiej Brytanii, nawet
Kanada i Australia, Nowa Zelandia oraz Indie, a także kolonie zamorskie zgłaszają udział w wojnie.
Już się nie powtórzą stare błędy. Powstanie nowy świat i nowa cywilizacja, lepsza od obecnej, od dzi-
siejszej. Hitleryzm jest przemijającym zjawiskiem, jak wszystko, co zbudowane jest na przemocy. Nie
może być piękniejszego celu, niż wyswobodzenie Europy od opresji, niż stworzenie prawdziwego
zjednoczenia państw europejskich, ożywionych wspólnymi ideałami.”
Cf. Dictionary of Untranslatables. A Philosophical Lexicon, ed. by B. Cassin, transl. by S. Rendall /
Ch. Hubert / J. Mehlman / N. Stein / M. Syrotinski; transl. ed. by E. Apter / J. Lezra / M. Wood,
Princeton: Princeton University Press [e-book ed.], pp. 1004-1017.
Cf. ibid., p. 1004.
Cf. ibid., pp. 1138 ff.
W. Paravicini, Savoir-vivre et savoir-faire. Civilisation courtoise et civilisation technique dans les relations
entre France et Allemagne du Moyen Âge et aux Temps modernes (Conférences annuelles, 1), 1995. An
interesting example of the inconsistencies and ambiguities of the concept of Kultur can be seen in
the notion of  Kulturtasche, which does not mean “a bag of culture,” but rather a trivial thing like a
“beauty case.” Here we see lofty ideals boiled down to the mundane.
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errors will no longer be reproduced. A new world and a new civilization will
be created, better than the present, starting from today. Nazism is a transient
phenomenon, as everything that is built on violence. There can be no more
beautiful purpose than the deliverance of Europe from oppression, than the
creation of a true union of European states that animate common ideals.28
The role of Poland in this war was similar to Sobieski’s battle with the Ottoman
Empire in Vienna. The subtle distinction applies particularly to the dispute—since
the mid-eighteenth century—between the French-British vision of civilization and
German culture, between the universal character of civilization and the particular
nature of culture.29 Civilization is a word emerged thanks to Mirabeau the Elder
and designated a necessary process for mankind that is obligated to participate by
overcoming primitive barbarity.30 The Kultur—according to the meaning valuable
in the beginning of the twentieth century—is not a process but an initiation. Only
individuals, initiated into the Kultur, could be cultivate. So we have—on one
hand—the common “man” and—on the other—“superman.” The relation be-
tween civilization and culture were often brought into opposition of the French-
British savoir-vivre and German savoir- faire.31 Bildung and Kultur were so in the
past the instruments of distinction between humans, nations or continents.32
As Russia itself has undergone consecutive waves of German cultural and philo-
sophical influence, as exemplified within the Europeanization project of Peter the
Great starting in the eighteenth century, in 1945, the Soviet authorities promoted
again the Germanic culture model in all people’s republics. And if we insist on
finding a common denominator for all of Eastern Europe, in the end we can find
only the German model of culture and the concept of Weltanschauung (that be-
came dominant and common with the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism), a major
designate for all eastern European countries under Soviet domination in 1948.
The year 1948 became symbolically important for certain countries, such as
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but not so symbolically important for Poland, such
as 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976 and 1980. The year 1948 was marked in Poland by
the first trial of Auschwitz, the process of National Armed Force and other
processes and executions of opponents of the communist regime. In the same year
the Polish Workers’ Party was united with the Polish Socialist Party and became
the Polish United Workers’ Party. Thus, the history of Soviet domination in East-
ern and Central-Eastern Europe was in each country different and organized in a
diverse way. Therefore our common history in the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia, and also in occupied Austria (between 1945 and 1955) is full of
twists and turns, and involving the creation of many new myths.
Probably one of the most widespread new myths of the second half of twentieth
century is the idea of the Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich (and moreover the belief that
he was a German). These kinds of myths allow nations to avoid direct or indirect
responsibility the terror that was wrought across Europe – an imagine cleaning
process that is accomplished by placing blame on a single person or a single myth-
ical state.. Hitler, determined in 1951 by Roger Caillois to be an idol of the nation
and in the after-war period a symbol for bestiality,33 becomes in the twenty-first
century normalized, through innovative narrations and new myths.34
VII.
The first attempt to rewrite a common history of the twentieth century was sup-
posed to be written since 1972 in the framework of the joint Polish-German His-
tory Textbooks Commission, established under the auspices of UNESCO.35
Writing out the common history of Europe is certainly a challenge of the century,
and Central and East European History of the twentieth century in particular.
The first step in this direction should be the identification of the most important
historical facts, specific to Central and Eastern Europe, concerning beginnings
and turning points. Only then will it be possible to reflect on the common and
unique identity of this part of Europe, which certainly could be reinforced by
Cf. R. Caillois, Le Pouvoir charismatique: Adolf Hitler comme idole, in: Id, Oeuvres, Paris: Gallimard
2008, pp. 330 ff.
Cf. G. D. Rosenfeld (2014): Hi Hitler. How the Nazi Past is being Normalized in Contemporary Cul-
ture, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cf.: http://library.fes.de/library/netzquelle/deutsch-polnisch/schulbuch.html [15.10.15]; Cf.
http://ece.columbia.edu/files/ece/images/HistoryoftheGerman-PolishTextbookCommission-3.pdf
[15.10.15].
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many glorious but also shameful points in our common history. This history must
be written down together, respecting each other not only throughout national sen-
sibilities, where the form of narrative and founding myths should be reconciled.
Only then it will be possible to write a common history, ἀλήθεια (alátheia) dis-
tinctly demarcated from δόξα (dóxa). To reflect this common heritage, including
heroes and enemies, a common sensibility will emerge. This shared sensibility will
not be just geographical or mental in nature, but also linguistic. An earlier attempt
at the creation of such a shared language arose in the multiethnic Poland of the
last century, namely in the creation Esperanto by Ludwik Lejzer Zamenhof. In re-
cent decades English would come to play the role intended for Esperanto. However
it is also important to make this language, foreign for each of us, and not imposing
a foreign content that would “knead” our identity in form of a new Weltanschauung
as did earlier the Germanization of Austria-Hungary, Prussia and Germany or the
Russification of the Russian Empire or Sovietization of the Soviet Union. 
Already even the Visegrad group should have its own identity and in the new
European order a proper image of the world, its resources, politics and history to
find its place in this world. This image of the world and the Weltanschauung are
even two different concepts. It might be worthwhile to go back to the initiative of
King Charles I of Hungary in 1335, inviting the sovereigns of Central Europe to
Visegrad in order to establish a common peace. It is the idea of community that
should be learned from the past and not the conviction that everything starts over
again. This is particularly important in 2015, six hundred eighty years later. It is
also important to keep in mind the Orwell’s diagnose: “Who controls the past,
[…] controls the future: who controls the present controls the past.” Included in
that process are the myths about the heroes and enemies reinforcing unity in each
community.
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